

**SECRET**

21 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Plans

SUBJECT : Request for Renewal of the LIENVOY Project

The LIENVOY Project is submitted for renewal for the period 1 February 1964 through 31 January 1965, for a total of \$47,068; \$20,530 for FY 1964 and \$26,538 for FY 1965. No additional funds are required for FY 1964; however, as the equipment approved in an amendment submitted in June 1963 for \$23,000 will not be ordered during the remainder of the present Fiscal Year.

1. Objectives: The LIENVOY Project provides for a joint CIA/Mexican Government sponsored telephone tap unit, and for a non-official liaison relationship which provides access to the highest level Mexican Government officials.

2. Agents: There have been no changes in agent personnel during the past year, and none are proposed during the coming year. Arnold F. AREHART, Staff Agent, continues to do an outstanding job in managing the top center and in keeping all technical equipment in repair.

3. Changes: During the past year, Headquarters approved the Station's plan to move the LIENVOY intercept center for security reasons, and to replace the older equipment with new and more mobile equipment. This move has been held in abeyance until this operation can be discussed with LITENSOR's successor and a mutual decision is made about the future operational pattern of the tap phase of LIENVOY. LITENSOR's successor will not officially replace him until December 1964. Meantime, the security of the intercept premises has been tightened and it is believed that LITENSOR or LIELEGANT could handle any problems which might arise.

**SECRET**

SECRET

-2-

4. Intelligence Production: LIENVOY is one of the most productive telephone tap projects in KUBARK of both FI and CE type information. From 1 February 1963 through 15 January 1964, this project has been the source of 309 positive reports, 56 of which were not disseminated. LIENVOY-2 was the source of 16 reports, and the tap intercept program accounted for the remaining 293. No customer evaluations were requested, but WH/3 evaluates the product as being valuable and covering a wide range of topics difficult to cover through other sources. The types of reports originating from this Project include such matters as:

LIENVOY-2: Communist and leftist activity in Mexico  
Communist publications  
International congresses  
Mexican political activities

LIENVOY: Communist and leftist personalities and activities in Mexico  
Travel  
Soviet and Satellite Activities in Mexico  
Cuban activities in Mexico and developments in Cuba  
International conferences and delegates  
Communist Chinese activities in Mexico

5. Effectiveness: In addition to the positive intelligence production this Project is the source of valuable CE information and operational leads. The intercept center covers 30 lines, all of which are of interest to KUBARK and approximately one-half of them are exclusively for KUBARK. These 30 lines include Mexican Communist and leftist leaders, Prensa Latina, the Local Security Service (Direccion Federal de Seguridad-DFS), 5 lines on the Soviet Embassy, 3 on the Cuban Embassy, 2 on the Czech Embassy, and since September 1963 there have been 3 on the Yugoslav Embassy. This center records an average of 525 reels per month, from which the tap center monitors prepare daily summaries of significant items gleaned from all the lines. These daily resumes total between 100 to 150 pages per month. The tap center monitors prepare full transcripts in Spanish for the Cuban, Yugoslav, and Soviet Embassy lines. The reels for the Soviet and Satellite coverage are given

SECRET

**SECRET**

-3-

the Station for passage to Station assets who translate the Soviet, Czech and Yugoslav portions.

Coverage of the Cuban, Czech, Yugoslav and Soviet Embassies provide details of their personnel, their contacts, travel and other useful CE data. Information gained from this source has led to a successful recruitment in the Yugoslav Embassy during the past year.

Examples of some important non-disseminable information obtained through LIENVOY during the past year are:

a. During May, through LIENVOY, the Station uncovered a harassment operation directed against the U.S. Embassy by the use of forged routine forms to embarrass the Embassy and known anti-Communists.

b. Several contacts made by U.S. citizens with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies, and with Mexican Communists were recorded. This information is given special dissemination to the FBI for their action. The most significant of these contacts was that by Lee OSWALD with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico prior to the assassination of the late President KENNEDY. OSWALD's contact was cabled to Headquarters on 8 October 1963 and this information was immediately disseminated to the appropriate ODYOKE offices.

c. During August LIENVOY contributed support to the REDWOOD AEJUMBO operation by providing information on contacts between principals involved in this sensitive SR operation.

6. Problems: There have been no significant security, cover, control, or liaison problems during the past year.

7. Liaison: This Project encompasses an unofficial liaison relationship with high-level Mexican government officials which contributes to the friendly attitude of that Government toward ODYOKE. On 23 November, the day after the assassination of the

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

-4-

late President Kennedy, the Chief of Station alerted Mexican officials to selected LIENVOY coverage of the Cuban Embassy which concerned Lee OSWALD. As a result they took immediate action favorable to PBPRIME by making appropriate arrests, conducting interrogations, rejecting a Cuban Embassy protest note, and killing a Soviet propaganda effort to place the blame on minority groups in PBPRIME.

In December 1963, a KUBARK official traveled to Mexico with a visual presentation concerning the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela. There he gave a special briefing to LITENSOR, pointing out the authenticity of the Cuban origin of these arms, and thus contributing significantly to a reaction by the Mexican Government on this important inter-American matter favorable to ODYOKE.

In connection with a trip made by LITENSOR to several East and West European countries in March and April 1963, the Station was provided several briefing papers on these countries, prepared by KUMONK and KUWOLF, for passage to LITENSOR. LITENSOR's official party was also provided contact with a KUBARK official in each West European city so that he might send classified messages to certain trusted Mexican officials through KUBARK channels if he so wished.

8. Inter-Agency Coordination: No formal inter-Agency coordination is required in this Project. The Chief, PBSWING, Mexico, is the only ODYOKE representative in Mexico outside KUBARK who is aware of this project and its provision for a special channel to LITENSOR. Such matters as the special briefing on the arms cache in Venezuela were discussed in detail with him.

9. Plans: No significant operational changes are planned during the coming Project year. In December 1964 LITENSOR will probably be replaced by LITEMPO-2. This should cause no major adjustments since the Station is already on good terms with LITEMPO-2 under the LITEMPO Project. It is anticipated that LITEMPO-2 will continue the intercept program without change.

10. Funds: Approval is requested for the renewal of the

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

-5-

LIENVOY Project for the period 1 February 1964 through 31 January 1965 for a total of \$47,068; \$20,530 for FY 1964 and \$26,538 for FY 1965. No additional funds are required for FY 1964 since sufficient funds remain from the past approval to cover the \$20,530 required under this renewal request.

11. Recommendations: WH Division recommends renewal of this Project based upon the above memorandum and the attached field request.

*R. W. Herbert*

J. C. KING  
C/WHD

**SECRET**